Assessing technological innovations: From early warning to the governance of socio-technical transformations

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“With technology we want to secure prosperity and survival, but at the same time threaten our future to the extreme”

Helmar Krupp
(founding director of Fraunhofer ISI)
1 Introduction

For a long time, until the middle of the 20th century, technological progress was commonly equated with societal progress leading to economic growth, social wealth and well-being. However, this technological optimism had already begun to crack as a result of the horrors of the atomic bomb in World War II and came also in civilian contexts under further pressure, for instance, with regard to the environmental and human risks of the use of pesticides in the 1960s (Carson 1962). As the awareness of the ambivalence of technologies increased in politics and the public (Daddario 1966), the strong need emerged to create robust knowledge on the unintended and potentially adverse effects of a specific technology entering markets and society, and to contrast this with the technology’s promises and potential benefits.

The world’s first institution for such a task of ‘technology assessment’ was launched by the U.S. Congress in 1972. It was named Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and installed as a science-based body for parliamentary policy advice (Kunkle 1995; Bimber 1996). Although the founding history of the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI) is a different one (cf. chapter XXX in this volume)¹, it is from a historical perspective certainly no coincidence that OTA and Fraunhofer ISI were founded in the same year (1972), given the broader societal context at that time with its increasing discomfort with new or more frequently applied technologies leading, for example, to severe environmental degradation such as intensive air and water pollution, related diseases, corrosion, fish kill, or high cost of river filtrate (Grandjean 1960; Baram 1970; Reimer 1971).

Since the foundation of OTA, technology assessment (TA) has developed, established and diversified as an interdisciplinary field of problem-oriented research practices (Paschen et al. 1978; Grunwald 2019). This chapter aims to outline the field’s development to date. In loose alignment with the work of Kuhn (1962), the Austrian sociologist Bogner (2021) distinguishes three ‘paradigms’ of TA in its rather brief history. In a first paradigm or phase (‘politicization’), beginning in the late 1960s, TA aimed at increasing the number of options for policy making, fighting the idea that everything is determined by the technology itself, and therefore turning technology into a political, debatable issue. Given the steering optimism of that time, the expertise of scientists was meant to help creating a scientific knowledge base that gives orientation for political decision-making on new technologies (Coates 1974). This has been described as the expert model of ‘classic’ TA (Grunwald 2002, pp. 123ff.).

In a second paradigm (‘democratization’), becoming dominant in the 1980s, TA aimed at increasing the inclusion of people and stakeholders affected by technological projects, striving to democratize (the assessment of) science and technology, a field that had long been considered as a matter for scientific experts alone. Given the large societal conflicts on technologies such as nuclear energy or genetic engineering, especially in Europe, the perspectives and (local) expertise of citizens and stakeholders were meant to widen the value (and knowledge) base for decision-making in the political and administrative institutions, increasing its social robustness, and to influence or even co-create the design of technologies. This has been described as the ‘participatory turn’ of TA or simply as ‘participatory TA’ (Joss et al. 2002).

In a third paradigm or phase (‘pragmatization’), since the 2000s to date, TA has aimed at contributing to the responsible design, implementation and governance of technological innovations. Given the ‘normative turn’ (Daimer et al. 2012) in national and supranational science,

¹ This working paper is a pre-print to be published in an anthology on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Fraunhofer ISI in 2022, entitled “Innovation and systems research in transition – 50 years of continuity and change in supporting innovation and transformation policies” (forthcoming). All tentative references, such as “chapter XXX in this volume”, refer to this anthology.
technology and innovation (STI) policies towards the so-called ‘grand societal challenges’, both technological and social innovations are increasingly seen as important means to address these challenges, being it demographic or climate change. In this context, TA has taken a rather ‘pragmatic’ position using diverse forms of expertise and processes of knowledge production to reflect upon technologies and societal discourses on possible socio-technical futures.

Of course, these three TA paradigms or phases are not to be understood as strictly separated from each other (Bogner 2021). Not only do they overlap temporally, but the diverse TA approaches developed in a specific phase (such as expert based and participatory models) have also been taken and adapted to the changed context conditions in later phases. Especially the current ‘pragmatic’ paradigm is characterized by a “peaceful coexistence” (Bogner 2021, p. 56) of diverse TA approaches that have proven to be valuable in the past. The paradigms also reflect different constellations in the relationship between TA and science in general. Wehling (2021), a sociologist of science, distinguishes four types of such constellations: a scientific (dominant in the paradigm of ‘classic’ TA; cf. Wynne 1975), a constructivist, a participative (both dominant in the second paradigm to date), and a normative-reflexive constellation. The latter represents a rather new and fuzzy development, since the (‘classic’) claim of neutrality and the question of TA’s implicit or explicit normativity have recently become a central topic of self-reflexive debates within TA (Nierling et al. 2020; Torgersen 2019) – with an open outcome.

In this chapter, we take the three TA paradigms as a rough temporal division and further outline the development of the field of technology assessment in a broad sense focusing on Germany, the USA and Europe. In contrast to Bogner (2021), our aim is not to define and justify such paradigms or phases, but to illustrate the development in more detail and practice-oriented terms. We therefore focus on concrete projects and studies, on the (ever new) search for and development of appropriate assessment methods, and on the connection to the thematic waves (‘hype cycles’) of specific groups of technologies, such as energy, genetic or information technologies. In addition, since Fraunhofer ISI has played an active and influential role in the field from the beginnings to date, we highlight some of its activities to illustrate the field’s development.
The beginnings: expert-based TA as policy advice

In the late 1960s, concerns about technological innovations and their effects became increasingly known in the USA. They came from environmentalists, doctors and psychotherapists and were bundled together via complaints to the legal system. Thus, it is surprising only at first glance that the demand for systematic forecasting of new (and known) technical developments appeared very early in jurisprudential publications (Baram 1970). Green (1967), for instance, states:

“The basic question is whether our legal system is capable of imposing effective social control over new technologies before they inflict very substantial, or even irreparable injury upon society. It seems clear that we cannot rely on the courts alone to protect society against fast-moving technological developments. Judge-made rules of law always come after, and usually long after, the potential for injury has been demonstrated.” (Green 1967, cited in Baram 1970, p. 569)

The technical fields addressed by lawyers and courts at that time include motorization, aviation, genetic engineering, and nuclear power. However, the reactive nature of the courts and the limited knowledge of judges of the various fields of technical, economic, and societal impacts made it obvious that they could not serve as society’s primary instrument for TA. The limits to growth report to the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972) added another global and far-reaching topic on limited natural resources to the discussion, using new types of simulation models (such as system dynamics by Forrester 1971) and the increasing capacity of computers.

In this challenging situation, it became very clear that there had to be both interdisciplinary scientific training and corresponding research funding for the development and application of projection methods and their interdisciplinary linkage. Both were achieved through corresponding initiatives by U.S. universities (e.g., in the Boston area; cf. Baram 1970, pp. 576-578) and the establishment of the Research Applied to National Needs Program (RANN) of the National Science Foundation (NSF). Between 1970 and 1976, the NSF supported 43 TA studies and 23 methodological studies, surveys, and conferences (Coates 1978, pp. 54-59). This support of the NSF was an essential contribution for capacity building in interdisciplinary research, facilitating also the start of work of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in the USA in 1973 (Coates 1976).

The OTA is the first institutional format of TA and represents a first benchmark or model for an ‘expert-based TA’, building ‘own’ expertise for the legislative power in distinction to the U.S. Government. OTA started with a 10 million Dollar program on issues of energy, food, oceans, health, materials, transportation, and also on methodological developments and limits (Coates 1978, pp. 63-65). Similar considerations on methods, new technical developments, and the political process were published by Hetman (1973) to inform governments of the OECD countries. In this context (Hetman 1978), a booklet on methodological guidelines for TA, co-authored by F. Hetman, J. Coates, E. Jochem, and H. Paschen, was also produced (OECD 1975). This booklet is very balanced in its own assessment of the various techniques and sensible in its awareness of their strengths and limitations. It avoids the temptation of staking everything on one particular technique or quantitative method, a fault which bedevils much of the literature at that time.

In Germany, first attempts to institutionalize TA at the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) started already in the 1970s (TAB 2022). The establishment of a parliamentary “Enquête Commission” in 1985 finally boosted the debate. While the basic decision to establish a parliamentary TA institution was taken rather quickly, the discussion about the organizational form and mode of operation of this institution included a second parliamentary “Enquête Commission” and lasted until 1989 (Petermann 1994). The Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag (TAB) was finally established in 1990 (Paschen et al. 2005). It was clearly inspired by the OTA and has given policy advice to the Parliament since then.
Before being involved in both parliamentary “Enquête Commissions” that paved the way for the foundation of TAB, Fraunhofer ISI completed a study (Krupp et al. 1978) suggesting a special research program on TA at the German Research Foundation (DFG) and (1) recommending pertinent areas of TA research activities in Germany, (2) addressing the difficulties and challenges involved with interdisciplinary research, and (3) proposing organizational procedures for supporting TA research. However, the proposal was not implemented by the DFG.

Nevertheless, TA research was emerging in the 1970s, also in Germany. One important research question, for instance, addressed the limitations of the expert-based TA concept with regard to forecasting, i.e. the methodological challenge to identify unintended impacts and to produce knowledge on their causal interrelationships, which might even change in the future. Three TA studies exploring the limitations of such analyses were conducted in the 1970s and mid-1980s.

First, a problem-oriented partial TA study (Denton et al. 1976) focused on the intended and unintended impacts of a further possible strong oil price increase (which became real in 1979). The self-reflecting analysis brought up obviously lacking knowledge about the impact of reduced demand of final energies produced from crude oil. In addition, there was little information on short-term options for the substitution of oil products in case that crude oil prices double or triple. Short-term elasticities of demand and substitution of energies were unknown at that time. Therefore, assumptions on data had to be made and used in the newly designed system dynamics or simulation models. Furthermore, the input-output table of the West German economy was projected according to the changing energy flows, demand, and investments.

Second, in contrast to the considerable uncertainties with regard to future developments, an ex-post TA study on motorization in the former Federal Republic of (West) Germany for the period from 1953 to 1973 (Jochem et al. 1976) showed that if historical analogy can be used, the predictions can be very accurate and complete. This was possible because of the comparable motorization in the USA between 1919 and 1939 which could be used as reference (for the approach of a retrospective TA see Coates et al. 1979).

Third, an ex-ante TA study on three different applications of solar energy (decentralized thermal solar energy, photovoltaics, and satellite photovoltaic use) (Jochem et al. 1988) demonstrated the limitations of TA in various aspects such as available time and budget, empirical data, controversial opinions or assumptions within the research team, lacking methods etc. Although the research team was large, quite interdisciplinary, and working together for more than two years, the limitations of realizing the TA concept were manifold (see Table 1). Major limitations were related to

- the available time and budget (33% of all critical notes collected during the TA process referred to that). The research team often had to stop looking for empirical data or new projection models and evaluation tools.
- lacking data, methods, or knowledge (34%). This limitation of the analytical steps taken was a challenge and frustrating as the quantification of intended or unintended impacts was often not possible or only with high degrees of uncertainty.

Lower importance was attributed to principal limitations of prognosis (15%), using data from other sources, although the authors were not convinced about their reliability (8%), and doubts about the own assumptions and results within the team (7%).
Table 1: Critical self-evaluation during the TA process: Frequency of critical notes by members of the research team with respect to analytical steps and areas of limitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical step of TA</th>
<th>Time and budget limits</th>
<th>Taking data from others, despite critiques</th>
<th>Controversial opinions within the team</th>
<th>Questioning own assumptions and results</th>
<th>Lack of data, methods, or knowledge</th>
<th>Principal limitations of prognosis</th>
<th>Personal and institutional limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenarios</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present status of technology</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Impacts on:</td>
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<td>- safety</td>
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<td>- society &amp; individual</td>
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<td>- legislation</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>- military</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditions for realization and policies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>45 times</td>
<td>11 times</td>
<td>2 times</td>
<td>9 times</td>
<td>47 times</td>
<td>20 times</td>
<td>3 times</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jochem et al. 1988, p. 353

The low number on "controversial opinions within the team" (see Table 1) was in contrast to the political debate in the 1970s and early 1980s. An example is the labeling of renewable energies as "additive energies" by the German energy providers in the 1980s arguing that solving existing energy problems by "additive energies" was actually more hope than reality (Benz 1987).

As TA in its beginnings was explicitly understood as systemic analysis and projection, the new methods of system dynamics analysis (Forrester 1971) and graph methods (Boissevain 1979) were often applied in the 1970s. In the following decades, they were more and more substituted by other methods developed and used by various scientific disciplines. However, given that the role of scientific experts in policy advice and public debates in general was increasingly criticized (Nennen et al. 1996), new approaches of involving stakeholders and citizens in TA processes were also developed and tested (Várkonyi 2000). Of course, expert-based TA approaches are still in use today, but they have been complemented by methods of integrating and dealing with different types of actors and their specific expertise and perspectives, as will be shown in the following sections.

In other areas, such as Health Technology Assessment (HTA), the expert-based model has been dominating until today. Although originating in OTA activities as well, HTA has over the decades taken its own pathway of differentiation and institutionalization (Banta 2003). Nowadays, HTA sees itself as an evidence-based instrument to support policy or management decisions within the healthcare system (e.g., whether the use of a new medical technology should be reimbursed by health insurances or not). At the forefront of the evaluation are, therefore, the efficacy and safety as well as the costs (or the cost-benefit ratio) of a new medical technology, while ethical and social aspects are dealt with rather rarely.
The participatory turn

Already in the 1960s and early 1970s, a wider public debate on science and technology was considered as an important element of TA. Accordingly, the critical public engagement in science and technology was seen as one of the driving forces for the institutionalization of TA in general and also for the foundation of OTA (Joss 2002). However, the OTA actually developed mainly into an expert-driven institution. As Joss (2002) points out, a main reason for this development lies in the fact that OTA was founded to provide scientific and technological intelligence for the U.S. Congress in order to counterbalance the respective expertise available at the White House. Since OTA was perceived as a role model for TA in political discussions worldwide, the expert-based mode of TA became prevalent in many countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Bimber et al. 1997) – also in Germany.

A broader involvement of the public into TA emerged again on the political agenda in the 1980s when an increasing scepticism and critical discussion of new technologies came up. For example, in 1978, the human gene for insulin was first isolated and cultivated in bacteria, and in 1982, human insulin produced by genetically modified bacteria was introduced to the market (The 1989). Genetic engineering, reproduction medicine (e.g., in vitro fertilization), other medical technologies, but also nuclear energy, automation in manufacturing, environmental pollution and related technologies steered public debates on risks and (to a lesser extent) chances of new technologies. Calls for stricter legislation of (perceived) risky technologies came along with these debates resulting in the first specific regulations of genetic engineering in some European countries such as Denmark where a genetic engineering act was issued in 1986 (Joss 2002).

Regulation of new technologies in general and biotechnology in particular became highly controversial issues not only in the public domain but also in politics, industry, and science. To what extent legislation was hampering international competitive positions of key industries was one of the issues. An important contribution of Fraunhofer ISI to this debate was a detailed analysis of genetic engineering regulations and their implementation in main world regions (Europe, USA, Japan), which came to the conclusion that there was no systematic competitive disadvantage of European countries including Germany due to legislation compared to other world regions (Hohmeyer et al. 1994).

In the TA communities, such intensive discussions led to a renaissance of the idea of public participation in TA, democratization of technology development and, in general, a stronger focus on affected stakeholder groups – participatory technology assessment (pTA) entered the stage.

The conceptional foundation of pTA is based on Habermas (1968) as discussed by Hennen (2012). Habermas (1968) elaborates on the relationship between scientific expertise and political decision-making and presented two ideal types of this relation: In the decisionist model, policy makers use information from scientists, but power and interests finally shape the goals for which scientific information is employed. Here, scientific expertise could be considered as politically instrumentalized (Hennen 2012). On the other hand, in the technocratic model all political issues are reduced to factual ones assuming that decision-making issues can be resolved on the basis of science and technology. Here, political debate is replaced by expertise (Hennen 2012). Habermas (1968) realized that none of these extreme models provide an adequate description of political reality, and he proposed, as some kind of synthesis, a ‘pragmatist’ model. In this model, normative claims in policy making have to be examined with regard to generalizability, feasibility, cost, and utility in the light of scientific and technological knowledge. At the same time, scientific and technological knowledge need to be assessed against normative and evaluative standpoints.
According to Hennen (2012), this pragmatic approach forms the basis for pTA since the pragmatic discourse between science and policy making depends on an informed public debate.

The diffusion of pTA starting from the mid-1980s was fueled by the development of and experimentation with new methods for public engagement in TA and by the institutionalization of TA with a specific focus on pTA. In Europe, Denmark became the forerunner of this movement. In 1985, the *Danish Board of Technology* (DBT) was set up by the Danish Parliament (Joss 2002). Main motives for its foundation were intensive political debates and public controversy about modern biotechnology and reproductive medicine (Klüver 2000). Two large Danish companies (Novo and Nordisk Gentofte) had announced their plans to produce human insulin using genetically modified bacteria. DBT developed and implemented new methods for stakeholder participation and public engagement in these controversy debates. These include in particular ‘consensus conferences’, which became a kind of brand of the DBT, but also ‘voting conferences’, ‘scenario workshops’, and ‘future search conferences’ (see, for instance, Slocum 2003).

Shortly after the setting up of the DBT, the *Netherlands Organization for Technology Assessment* (NOTA; now Rathenau Institute), was created in 1986 (Joss 2002). The mission of NOTA was to broaden the basis for decision-making in science and technology by addressing social consequences and integrating different societal stakeholder into TA processes. NOTA also experimented with new participatory methods including ‘science shops’. Other institutions and countries joined these trends, for example Switzerland and Germany. The *Swiss Science and Technology Council* (now TA-SWISS) was founded in 1992 and, among others, developed the so-called ‘Publiforum’ adopting experiences from the DBT. In Germany, the *Academy for Technology Assessment in Baden-Württemberg* was founded, also in 1992 (but closed in 2003), with a strong focus on exploring new methods for public participation such as ‘Bürgerfora’ (Renn 2002).

The German TAB in contrast, although founded in 1990 (see section 2), was largely rooted in the concept of ‘classic’ TA. As an institution steered by a parliamentary committee, specific framework conditions and limitations arose. While Paschen (1999) stated that TAB has implemented many modern TA concepts, he also admitted that certain ideas were hardly feasible since, for example, many parliamentarians were critical of broad citizen participation activities because they see this as “questioning the decision-making sovereignty of MPs legitimized by elections” (Paschen 1999, p. 84; own translation; see also Grunwald 2003). This was also reflected, at least in the early years of TAB, in the orientation of the studies, which mostly focused on large-scale and cutting-edge research. A distinguishing feature compared to other TA institutions of that time was the continuous monitoring of future technologies, but also of ‘soft’ factors such as citizens’ perceptions of technology (aka technology acceptance).

Starting from the late 1990s, Fraunhofer ISI became engaged in particular in public discourses on biotechnology with a focus on education. Specific curricula for debating biotechnology in classrooms were elaborated together with teachers (Gaiser et al. 2000). Another tool were films on biotechnology for higher education and vocational training of teachers, which were produced in cooperation with the *Film Academy Baden-Württemberg*. During that period, foresight approaches were increasingly integrated into TA not only focusing on future trends in science and technology but also on key societal issues. As elaborated in chapter XXX (in this volume), Fraunhofer ISI made important contributions to this development.

Not only specialized institutions engaged in pTA but also ‘new entrants’ such as museums (Joss 2002). For example, in the United Kingdom, the first consensus conference on plant biotechnology adopting the Danish model was organized and implemented at the *Science Museum* in London in 1994. In Germany, the first citizens’ conference on human genetic testing was hosted by the *German Hygiene Museum* in Dresden in 2001 (Zimmer 2002). And in 2008, the *Boston Museum of Science* was partner in a consensus conference on nanotechnology in the USA (Guston 2022).
Although most pTA approaches were pursued in Europe, some more recent examples outside Europe are worth mentioning (Hahn et al. 2022): In South Korea, participative elements such as ‘citizen fora’ are included in the parliamentary TA process; in South Africa, multi-stakeholder participatory assessments were implemented with a focus on evaluating developments in biotechnology; Australia initiated participatory approaches on a regional level for environmental management involving experience and knowledge of indigenous communities.

Most interesting is the development in the USA since 1995 considering the pioneering role of the OTA and its closure in that year (Guston 2022). In parallel to building up mainly expert-mode oriented TA capacities in the Government Accountability Office (GAO), pTA approaches were initiated in a less institutionalized way mainly by an academics group called Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and Technology (ECAST). ECAST evolved in the aftermath of the above-mentioned consensus conference on nanotechnology conducted by the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (CNS-ASU). Recently, ECAST explored public perspectives of human gene editing based on CRISPR technology. As Guston (2022) points out, ECAST intensively strives for international networking and is collaborating among others with the DBT.

Along with the diffusion of pTA in the 1980s and 1990s, fundamental critique of this approach increasingly emerged in the science policy domain (Gethmann 2002). Mainly three critical points were raised (Hennen 2012): i) lack of impact, ii) instrumentalization, and iii) tampering of laypeople’s perspectives by experts.

1) Lack of impact refers to the observation that a direct influence of pTA on political decision-making is hardly detectable. However, as Hennen (2012) argues, this is not specific to pTA but can be observed for many types of scientific advice. Nevertheless, possible impact of pTA on the political decision-making process is hampered by a specific systematic feature of any TA process: TA has a systemic perspective and aims at exploring the full complexity of technical developments. Thereby, TA increases the complexity of decision-making processes at stake making it less likely that outcomes of the process are directly used by policy makers.

2) Instrumentalization is an inherent risk not only of pTA but of many laypeople or expert based consulting processes (Stirling 2008). A key issue to avoid or minimize instrumentalization is the institutional setting of pTA (Hennen 2012). Independent institutions with clear mission statements minimize this risk.

3) Laypeople and experts can be perceived as complementary, without laypeople there are no experts. Accordingly, both play an important role in the pTA process. During the process, laypeople may change their view on a specific technological issue not least due to information provided by experts. This could be considered as tampering. On the other hand, as Hennen (2012) explains, this is also an indication of empowerment and learning in the pTA process: Minds are changing, new positions are taken.

In parallel with such critiques of pTA, evaluations activities were initiated. For example, the European Commission (EC) launched two large studies analyzing pTA processes in different countries and technological domains. The EUROPTA study compared 16 different pTA projects and found that mainly two factors are important for the visibility and resonance of pTA (Hennen 2002): the character and status of the public debate, and the institutional and political setting of the procedure. Fraunhofer ISI contributed to the second study for the EC, the ADAPTA project (Gaisser et al. 2001), which explored pTA processes in several countries in three different technological domains: urban transport policy, genetically modified food, genetic and predictive testing. The findings for the case of Germany were rather sobering having detected only very low impact of pTA activities on policy processes and public debate (Gaisser et al. 2001). One of the few other systematic evaluations of the impact of pTA activities concerns the above-mentioned citizens’
conference on human genetic testing in the *German Hygiene Museum* in Dresden. In this case, Fraunhofer ISI could show how the mentioned empowerment process of laypeople worked in practice (Zimmer 2002).

Aside from pTA, there is another prominent TA approach having its roots in the 1980s: the concept of *Constructive Technology Assessment* (CTA) which had been developed in the Netherlands and Denmark (Rip et al. 1995). Even though the term CTA is used with different understandings, according to Schot and Rip (1997) there is a common feature of CTA, namely the modulation of ongoing technology development by all relevant stakeholders. As Schot and Rip point out, such a process can lead to new design practices of technologies which anticipate impacts and involve diverse societal groups from the beginning in a kind of societal learning. Although there is obviously some overlap to the idea of participation and inclusion in pTA, CTA has different theoretical foundations and focuses on the socially responsible design of technology (“better technology in a better society”, Rip et al. 1995). It has also been taken up by more recent concepts of technology and innovation governance such as *Responsible Research and Innovation* (RRI), which plays an important role in the next phase of TA outlined in the following section.
Managing and governing technological innovations

In the business world, TA used to have a notorious bad reputation as being hostile to innovation. TA was considered to be critical of technological progress, which was not entirely unfounded in view of the failure of major large-scale research projects in the 1970s and 1980s (for example, next generation nuclear energy reactors or magnetic levitation train). For these reasons, in the USA TA was sometimes denigrated as “technology arrestment” (Paschen et al. 1986, p. 22).

This does not mean, however, that there has not been a critical approach to technical progress in companies and among technicians. Since 1976, the Association of German Engineers (VDI) had been working on a guideline on TA, which was rooted in its technology-reflecting tradition of engineering responsibility, but also took up the academic and political discussion of the time. This guideline – which was always controversial even within the association – was finally adopted in 1990 (VDI 1991). In terms of its character, it was not a ‘recipe book’ for TA, but it had a considerable influence in industry and among engineers, mainly by raising awareness of the general TA discussion (Haberland 2016; König 2021). However, the guideline differed from other contemporary concepts of TA by their explicit orientation towards innovation processes in industrial contexts.

At the same time, the working group on TA in North Rhine-Westphalia noted a “crisis of the traditional TA concept” (Bröchler et al. 1998, p. 31). Apart from the orientation towards political and administrative decision-makers as TA’s primary addressees they criticized the dominance of scientific experts and the focus on recommending options for policy making. According to the authors, this “traditional” TA approach was based on the premises that scientific analyses can be translated into political decisions, that the state is capable of effectively steering technical development and that this steering can be done by parliament (Bröchler et al. 1998, p. 34). They expressed doubts as to whether these premises were (still) valid, especially since the state technocratic approach had fallen into disrepute after the failure of many large-scale research projects. Instead, the example of Silicon Valley seemed to show that the market could produce innovations faster and more in line with demand: “TA is in danger of lagging behind the development of technology. TA is called upon to deal with this problem more intensively in conceptual and methodological terms” (Bröchler et al. 1998, p. 34). Moreover, social and technical developments could no longer be controlled by politics alone, but take place in networks of actors from the state, economy, science, civic associations and society. Finally, TA had to take into account the recognizable “change in consciousness [of companies] in their relationship to the social environment” and is called upon to "emphasize the non-technical factors in the process of shaping technology” (Bröchler et al. 1998, p. 35).

Such a turn towards TA as a “pragmatic innovation management” (Bogner 2021, pp. 51ff.) had parallels with the concept of innovation systems, which gained popularity since the mid-1980s and emphasized that the flow of knowledge and technology between people, companies and institutions is the key to innovative processes (Fraunhofer ISI 2012; see also chapter XXX in this volume). Against this background, Meyer-Krahmer (1999, p. 214), a former director of Fraunhofer ISI, at a conference on the occasion of “25 years of TA in Germany” pointed out that the contrast between problem-induced and technology-induced TA had to be overcome. In view of the increasing international and institutional integration of innovation actors, a development from a state-centered approach to a multi-actor-approach seemed necessary.

In order to remedy these weaknesses and to counter the perception of TA (especially in industry) as technology-hostile and innovation-inhibiting, an innovation-oriented TA was called for, which could influence technology design through "organized innovation processes" (Tschiedel 1997, cited in Haberland 2016). Thus, in 2000, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)
adopted central arguments for innovation-oriented TA, enriched them with considerations from social constructivist science and technology studies (STS) (Bode 2002), and finally presented a concept for the reorientation of TA under the title "Innovation and Technology Analysis", or ITA in short (Brüntink 2001). ITA was meant to complement and integrate existing TA measures and projects (Astor et al. 2000, p. 19), whereby ‘complement’ meant in particular an increased addressing of businesses. According to Brüntink (2001, p. 8), the ITA concept included “the promotion of cooperation between ITA and industry. [...] Innovation processes take place in companies, innovative companies change the economy and – more and more frequently – thereby also society.” The proponents of ITA assumed that companies do not act exclusively according to profitability criteria, but also take social needs into account in the sense of a collective responsibility for the common good and concluded that “ITA is one, if not the tool of choice for companies” (Baron et al. 2003, p. 34; emphasis in the original). In that sense, ITA had a “problem-solving potential [...] for the German economy” and was a management tool that "could draw on mature methods and be useful for the economy" (Baron et al. 2003, p. 22, 24).

From the beginning, BMBF understood ITA as a strategic attempt to bring together the different TA traditions. ITA was expected to support policy makers with recommendations for science, technology and innovation (STI) policy. Participatory approaches should be used to involve citizens and consumers in the development process in order to increase social acceptance. And finally, BMBF hoped to provide companies with knowledge about technical alternatives, foreseeable obstacles and framework conditions to be considered (Astor et al. 2000). For the established TA community, it was not so clear whether ITA was really a new approach or just old wine in new bottles as many of its elements had already been part of TA since the 1960s (Grunwald 2001). Others considered ITA mainly as a marketing attempt to extend the target group of TA to industrial actors and suspected that it was a strategy for business development and to increase technology acceptance (Haberland 2016, pp. 83f.).

All in all, ITA remained a concept limited to Germany. Since 2002, more than 200 projects were funded resulting in an extension of the (academic) TA community. The character of these projects was admittedly diverse, but they mostly pursued a pragmatic approach that was actually concerned with an overall assessment of technological developments and responsible innovation design. The strong role of industry, both in the conduct and in the exploitation of the studies, has admittedly not been fulfilled: ITA has primarily remained an instrument of government research planning. In many cases, the focus was on specific so-called ‘key technologies’ such as information and communication technologies, nanotechnology, biotechnology and genetic engineering, with studies focusing less on technology risks and more on their contribution to societal needs and global challenges. Research also included studies on the human factor in innovation, for instance on factors influencing technology perceptions and what role these perceptions play for the market success (Hüsing et al. 2002). Finally, there was an increasing number of studies focusing on foresight of scientific and technological developments and their innovative impact.²

The discussions about ITA also had an impact when the contract for the operation of the German TAB had to be renewed in 2001. TAB’s operator, the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS), was requested to cooperate with Fraunhofer ISI and to supplement established areas of work by so-called ‘future reports’, ‘innovation reports’ and ‘policy benchmarkings’. Future reports aimed to analyze medium and long-term fields of development, the future reports were primarily intended to identify parliamentary need for action, while the innovation reports were meant to provide orientation knowledge about areas with high development dynamics (Cuhls et al.

² In 2021, BMBF renamed ITA into „Insight – Interdisciplinary perspectives on societal and technological change“, yet without fundamentally changing the underlying concept.
Although true foresight studies were never conducted as part of the TAB work program, the new study formats gained much popularity, especially as they also found the interests of other parliamentary groups and committees. In particular the innovation reports addressed current and urgent issues relating to the competitiveness and innovative capability of German industry (Nusser et al. 2007; Thielmann et al. 2009; Gandenberger et al. 2012).

Internationally, with the new millennium the time of the big technologies controversies was over. However, as in previous decades, some technological developments received particular attention, being often utopian visions of a technologically improved world. From 2000 on, this was primarily nanotechnology, thus the use of materials on an atomic, molecular, and supramolecular scale for industrial purposes. Visionary publications, such as those of Drexler et al. (1991) and Joy (2000) initiated an intense debate not only about the potential but also about the risks of nanotechnology which led to a series of TA studies in Germany and other European countries (Malanowski 2001; Paschen et al. 2003; Malsch et al. 2004; The Royal Society 2004). Some of these early studies were mainly concerned with the visionary aspects, which were linked to the notion that there is a convergence of Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno (NBIC) technologies, resulting in a fundamental boundary shift between the natural and the artificial, with the goal of enhancing human (physical, sensory, and cognitive) capabilities (Roco et al. 2003; Beckert et al. 2007). Later, most TAs on nanotechnology took a pragmatic approach and examined how much substance the promises of the technology visionaries actually had in specific application areas (e.g., NRM; Möller et al. 2009). Starting around 2010, research focused on very specific problem areas such as nanotoxicology or product safety, with the goal of defining requirements that the new technology must meet in order to fulfill its promises. This has, for instance, resulted in a long-term activity like the "Nanotrust" project coordinated by the Austrian Institute of Technology Assessment, which has been investigating specific safety and risk-relevant aspects of nanomaterials and providing input for the regulation of innovative materials continuously since 2007.

Another substantive strand of TA research took up the notion of a networked world (Castells 1996) that became popular with the advent of the Internet and was discussed as ‘ubiquitous computing’, ‘ambient intelligence’, or later ‘Internet of things’. As in the case of nanotechnology, the first step was the analysis of certain technology visions that had strong impact in politics. An early example was the scientific deconstruction of ‘ambient intelligence’, a vision of the future information society where intelligent interfaces enable people and devices to interact seamlessly with each other and with the environment (Ducatel et al. 2001). Several TA studies showed how naive this idea actually was and highlighted the social and environmental risks involved (Hilty et al. 2003; Bizer et al. 2006; Wright et al. 2008). More recently, TA – especially those conducted on behalf of the European Parliament – has provided important input to the regulation of the connected world, from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016 to the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) at present (Boucher 2021; Christen et al. 2020; Kolleck et al. 2020).

Apart from issues of digitization, questions of energy, the environment and sustainability became a new urgency in the context of the predicted climate change, but also changed the way TA was dealing with them. Whereas traditional TA focused primarily on the risks of single technologies on the natural environment, the focus has moved towards systemic interrelationships between technologies, society and the environment (see also chapter XXX in this volume). With this change in perspective and in view of the global challenges, TA has increasingly turned its attention to questions of management and governance of innovations, also bringing other, non-technological innovations into the focus (Howaldt et al. 2019; Ozolina et al. 2009). Accordingly, more research is being conducted into how socio-technical constellations should look like if they are expected to

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3 See https://www.oeaw.ac.at/en/ita/nanotrust/
contribute to solving global challenges. The experts’ knowledge of the technology’s functions, effects and non-intended side effects plays an important role in this process, as does the identification and resolution of potential social conflicts through the participation of as many stakeholders as possible.

At the EU level, TA concepts have received strong attention since around 2010 under the term Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) or just Responsible Innovation (RI). Starting from debates on responsible development in the area of nanotechnologies in the early 2000s, RRI quickly attracted considerable attention in the academic discourse on the governance of research and innovation (Owen et al. 2021; Rip 2014). What is more, RRI as a concept was strongly promoted by powerful actors on the field of STI policy (cf. chapter XXX in this volume), particularly by the European Commission (EC), culminating in the integration of RRI as a crosscutting issue in the EC’s Research Framework Programme ‘Horizon 2020’ (2014-2020) (Blok 2023). This development was also conducive to the uptake of RRI-related initiatives in a number of countries and organizations (Wittrock et al. 2021).

RRI is an eclectic approach, building upon several earlier concepts (such as CTA, see section 3), partially integrating and developing them further. Apart from TA in its numerous guises, it makes use of concepts and disciplinary contributions from STS, ethics of science and technology, ELSA/ELSI research (ethical, legal, social aspects/implications), sustainable technology development, value sensitive design, responsible development, participatory and transdisciplinary research, research integrity, responsible metrics etc. (Lindner et al. 2016; Brundage et al. 2019).

According to the definition and framework developed by Stilgoe et al. (2013) that has gained the most attention in academia, RI comprises four elements that are also found in various directions of TA: anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion, and responsiveness. Anticipation is about carefully considering both the intended and potential unintended consequences of research and innovation activities, covering elements of expert TA and, to some extent, foresight. Reflexivity is about reflecting on the motivations, assumptions, and commitments underlying technological developments. At the same time, reflexivity also means questioning the normative basis of the assessment (Hennen et al. 2019; Kollek 2019; Nierling et al. 2019). Inclusion is closely related to public participation, which is the central element of pTA. It is not limited to citizens, but seeks to involve all relevant societal stakeholders (including businesses and politics) at an early stage in order to identify potential conflict fields and to reach a consensual design. Finally, responsiveness expresses that TA must not stop at the (ex-post) analysis and assessment of technologies, but must entail decisions and practical action. These decisions can then take the desirable and undesirable impacts of technology as well as the interests of citizens into account. Ideally, they result in solutions guided by values and norms in the interest of the common good.

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4 However, in the subsequent Research Framework Programme ‘Horizon Europe’ (2021-2027) the significance of RRI has strongly declined.
The description of the three TA paradigms or phases (expert-based, participatory, and pragmatic) shows that the paradigms are not strictly separated from each other. Rather, each highlights a specific, temporally dominant perspective on how to do TA. They all are still relevant today and continue to coexist. Figure 1 is an attempt to summarize and further illustrate the history of TA since the 1960s by roughly locating in time some of the technologies in focus, some of the methods introduced in TA, and the foundation of some TA institutions (see Figure 1).

Looking at the future of TA, it seems that problem-orientation is needed more than ever. The problem-orientation of TA had been discussed from the very beginnings (Enzer 1974) and had been, already some time ago, expected to gain importance in the future in order to address the grand societal challenges (Decker et al. 2010). Today, after the ‘normative turn’ (Daimer et al. 2012), STI policies have to a certain extent internalized such problem-orientation, following a so-called mission-oriented approach (see also chapter XXX in this volume) with the goal of overcoming grand societal challenges, such as demographic or climate change. We expect TA to increasingly contribute to this goal. TA would then need to focus not only on individual technologies, but rather on socio-technical transitions and the governance of urgent system transformations, being it the transformation of the mobility, energy, healthcare or nutrition system. Here, TA could contribute to find appropriate system solutions as combinations of (converging) technologies, innovations and also non-technological approaches. It would need to be embedded in knowledge and decision-making processes characterized by intense cooperation between science, industry, policy, administration, and society including NGOs, citizens, consumers and users. The involvement of society here is at least bi- if not multi-directional, on the one hand with regard to the development of products and technical solutions and their societal (consumer/user) acceptance, and on the other hand with regard to increasingly required behavioral changes in consumption and resource use.

Of course, such an orientation comes with several challenges. One is to mediate complex impact dependencies and to decide and navigate through innovation pathways whose differences are no longer to be determined by techno-economic or socio-technical criteria alone, but rather by ethical, ecological, societal, geo-political and other criteria, which we even might not know yet. This requires new instruments (and indicators) for assessment and a sound factual basis. In addition, with regard to its addressees, TA needs to communicate its findings in a way that reduces complexity and produces transparency through the explanation of assumptions and uncertainties. In the end, also governments, parliaments, and administrative actors in democratic societies are required to explain their (possibly TA-based) decisions in a transparent way, since they are exposed to the public discourse and to the problem that both decision criteria and scientifically derived assumptions will likely be questioned by parts of the society.
Figure 1: The assessment of technological innovations over time

Source: Own illustration, based on three phases by Bogner (2021). See appendix for further details and explanations regarding the TA institutions.
That entails another challenge for TA. Given the present crisis of confidence in science and scientific policy advice, not least obvious in the dispute on Covid-19 vaccination, TA also has an ambivalent position between claiming neutrality on the one hand and representing normative perspectives on the other (Hennen et al. 2019; Nierling et al. 2020; Torgersen 2019). This boils down to the question whether in an ever more complex, both techno-scientifically driven and democratic society the societal groups do trust the scientists and their research results, or whether they distrust whatever reasons they may have. And if they distrust, to what extent and with what means is it possible, to build up trust into TA processes and results (e.g., in terms of quality, correctness, independency) and acceptance by the various societal groups including those following right-wing populist views? What is more, legitimate questions may be raised regarding the weighting criteria used in TA processes. If TA aims to contribute, for instance, to the transformation towards a more sustainable society, how can there be trust if such a goal is politically not shared? And with regard to an increasingly mission-oriented STI policy, does it not automatically make itself vulnerable to discussions in social media and fake news when apparently established certainties and common assumptions are doubted?

A further challenge is the fact that technologies are in a specific stage of development and maturity when they get at the center of public or political attention at a given time. There is not only the well-known dilemma (Collingridge 1980) that at an early point in time little is known about the impacts and non-intended side effects of a technology, although the possibilities to control and shape the development are high, whereas at a later stage much more is known, but control is more difficult to achieve. In addition, technologies are subject to socially conditioned cycles of attention in research funding, in the media, and in the public and political discourse. It is therefore obvious to assume that one technology at other times, in different societal contexts, with different research efforts may be evaluated with different results leading to different selection and design mechanisms. If so, may then the push of certain technologies at a certain time possibly hinder the development of better, alternative solutions? This opens up a field of conflict with questions about how long and intensively specific and alternative technologies (as well as non-technical innovations) should be researched and evaluated before a societal decision can be made about their significance and use.

Finally, TA increasingly needs to face the global dimension of technologies and socio-technical change including geopolitical aspects. The foundation of the globalTA network in 2019 can only be a very first step in this regard (Hennen et al. 2022). Given the increasing importance and development of both sustainability goals (e.g., compliance with planetary boundaries, global justice, global health; cf. the UN Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs) and sustainability criteria (e.g., carbon footprint, water and energy consumption, living and health conditions), there is the need to establish local and regional structures of circular economies and value creation structures with reduced transport routes in light of current global trade. Moreover, with supply bottlenecks (e.g., of semiconductor chips and dependent products such as vehicles) in the Covid-19 pandemic and dependencies on energy (gas) but also other raw materials from Russia in light of the Ukraine war in 2022, the discussion on technology sovereignty, raw materials and technology dependencies on other countries (including China) have attained highest actuality (Edler et al. 2020). The assessment of stability and trust in countries and regions as trading partners is becoming a new and critical parameter in decision-making processes. In addition, there is the question of sufficiency in the (global) consumption of goods and mobility in today’s societies. This connects to more fundamental questions of how our economies could and should work, to what extent the development towards a post-growth society could be an option for achieving the sustainability

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5 See https://globalta.technology-assessment.info/
goals, and what role technological and social innovations (Sartorius et al. 2022) as well as TA (Grunwald 2018) might play in this regard.

With all those challenges, TA is more than ever asked to take the ‘bigger picture’ into account and not to focus too much on an individual technology alone. This implies questioning current hypes on the potential of new technologies, such as hydrogen or electric cars, to solve the grand societal challenges of our time. Certainly, TA will be needed for emerging technologies such as climate engineering and for the further digitization of our societies. With such new technologies and the challenges mentioned above comes the need for new approaches of TA so that it will remain an instrument providing guidance in a complex and uncertain technological environment in the coming decades.
Appendix

Year dates and abbreviations used in Figure 1 (* = foundation; † = closure):


1972/73: * OTA – Office of Technology Assessment at the U.S. Congress; closure in 1995

1977: * ITAS – Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis, at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology KIT (foundation of predecessor institution in 1977, as ITAS since 1995)

1985: * DBT – Danish Board of Technology

1985: * ITA – Institute of Technology Assessment, at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (originally as working group of a pre-existing research institute; as ITA since 1994)


1987: * STOA – European Parliament Office for Scientific and Technological Option Assessment

1989: * POST – Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, United Kingdom

1990: * TAB – Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag

1992: * TA-SWISS – Foundation for Technology Assessment, at the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences (originally founded as Swiss Science and Technology Council)


2005: * ETAG – European Technology Assessment Group (network of TA institutions)

2019: * globalTA – global Technology Assessment Network (network of TA institutions)
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